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I. INTRODUCTION
The Pirate Bay1 is the world’s largest bit-torrent tracker.2 The website
essentially hosts content uploaded by users to be downloaded by other users.
Because much of the exchanged content is protected by national and
international copyright law, The Pirate Bay is considered to be in violation of
those intellectual property protections.3 This activity has led to the arrest,
prosecution, and imprisonment of one of the website’s founders.4 Though
this action against the founders was successful, the website itself still exists
and boasts that “[zero] torrents [have] been removed, and [zero] torrents will
ever be removed.”5 Various supporters of The Pirate Bay have come up with
many methods and means to get around attempts at shutting down their
website, most notably installing servers on unmanned drones6 and moving
their servers to a cloud network.7
But recent international legal
developments may make these extraordinary measures unnecessary: the
Pirate Bay would not only be able to continue its activities, but would be able
do so legally.
In January of 2013, the twin-island nation of Antigua and Barbuda
(Antigua) announced that the World Trade Organization (WTO) had
authorized it to suspend certain obligations to the United States in regards
to intellectual property.8 This declaration came as a result of a decade-long

1 The Pirate Bay Bundle, THE PIRATE BAY, http://thepiratebay.se (last visited Nov. 20,
2013).
2 About, THE PIRATE BAY, http://thepiratebay.se/about (last visited Nov. 20, 2013).
3 Nick Bilton, The Pirate Bay Offers Web Browser to Avoid Censorship, N.Y. TIMES (May
19, 2015, 2:19 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/10/the-pirate-bay-offers-piratebro
wser-to-avoid-censorship/?_r=0.
4 Eric Pfanner, Four Convicted in Sweden in Internet Piracy Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18,
2009, at B2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/18/business/global/18pirate.html.
5 Legal Threats Against The Pirate Bay, THE PIRATE BAY, http://thepiratebay.se/legal (last
visited Nov. 20, 2013).
6 “MrSpock,” TPB Loss, PIRATE BAY BLOG (Mar. 18, 2012), https://thepiratebay.se/blog/
210; Nick Bilton, Internet Pirates Will Always Win, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2012, at SR5,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/05/sunday-review/internet-pirates-will-alwayswin.html.
7 Winston Brahma, The Pirate Cloud, THE PIRATE BAY (Oct. 17, 2012), http://thepir
atebay.se/blog/224; The Pirate Bay Moves to the Cloud to Avoid Shutdown, BBC (Oct. 17,
2012, 12:01 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-19982440.
8 Press Release, PRNewswire, Antigua to Pursue Sanctions Against the United States in
Decade-Long Trade (Jan. 28, 2013) [hereinafter Levick Release], available at http://www.anti
guawto.com/wto/Levick_Release.pdf.
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dispute between the two countries over the accessibility of Antigua-based
online gambling websites within the United States.9 The dispute settlement
system’s appellate body ruled that the U.S. practice of blocking access to
these websites violated its obligations under the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS).10 According to the United States Trade
Representative, Antigua’s suspension of U.S. copyright would be
unprecedented and amount to government-sponsored piracy.11 And to
whom would Antigua grant a letter of marque and reprisal? It seems they
will look to none other than The Pirate Bay.12
But what do you call a government-sponsored pirate?
History
occasionally grants such actors the label of “privateers.” The determination
of titles often depends on who is telling the story. During the American War
for Independence, the Colonies enlisted the aid of “merchant mariners” to
harass British shipping and support the Colonies’ cause.13 The United States
looks back fondly upon these “privateers.”14 The British, however, certainly
have a different recollection of the seamen that pirated their vessels.15 How
will the actions of Antigua and Barbuda be remembered? Like the pirates
and privateers of centuries past, this determination will depend on
perspective. However, unlike in the past, today’s perspectives can develop
based on overlapping international legal regimes, not conflicting national
security or military interests. For example, a sanction that is legal under the
WTO may be illegal under other international regimes, particularly under
9

Id.
General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1167 [hereinafter
GATS]; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 33
I.L.M. 1125 (1994); Paul Rothstein, Note, Moving All-In with the World Trade Organization:
Ignoring Adverse Rulings and Gambling with the Future of the WTO, 37 GA. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 151, 152 (2008).
11 Annie Lowrey, Caribbean Nation Gets an International Go-Ahead to Break U.S.
Copyright Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2013, at B4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/20
13/01/29/business/global/dispute-with-antigua-and-barbuda-threatens-us-copyrights.html.
12 David Kravets, WTO Allows Antigua to Open Piracy Site, WIRED (Jan. 29, 2013, 12:06
PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/01/antigua-piracy-site/; Ernesto, Pirate Bay and
Antigua Explore Launch of Authorized “Pirate Site,” TORRENTFREAK (May 3, 2013),
http://torrentfreak.com/pirate-bay-and-antigua-explore-launch-of-authorized-pirate-sit
e130503/.
13 John Frayler, Stories From The Revolution: Privateers in the American Revolution,
NAT’L PARK SERV., http://www.nps.gov/revwar/about_the_revolution/privateers.html (last
visited Nov. 20, 2013).
14 See, e.g., John Paul Jones, DISCOVERY YORKSHIRE COAST, http://www.discoveryorkshir
ecoast.com/history-and-info/region/john-paul-jones.aspx (last visited Nov. 20, 2013).
15 Id.
10
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some of the treaties administered by the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO).16
This Note examines what happens when those kinds of “cross-retaliation”
measures are imposed and result in conflicting status under international law.
First, this Note will examine in detail the development of the WTO
framework, specifically in regards to the WTO “grand bargain” and the rise
and development of cross retaliation. Second, this Note will discuss WIPO’s
main two treaties, as well as their relation to and interaction with the WTO
and its treaties. Third, this Note will contemplate the tensions between
TRIPS and the WIPO treaties, as well as other possible conflicts of a similar
nature with other regimes, such as the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
and the North American Free Trade Agreement. Fourth, this Note will look
to other international agreements that can serve as models to stem the tide of
future conflicts. Finally, this Note will explore the ramifications for
international law arising from these conflicts and outline a path forward for
developing international regimes in a more unified, streamlined fashion that
reduces, if not prevents, future conflicts of this nature.
II. BACKGROUND
A. WTO
1. Overview and the “Grand Bargain”
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an institution that “provides a
forum for negotiating agreements aimed at reducing obstacles to
international trade and ensuring a level playing field for all, thus contributing
to economic growth and development.”17 The WTO was formed from an

16

The World Intellectual Property Organization “is the global forum for intellectual
property services, policy, information and cooperation.” It is “a self-funding agency of the
United Nations, with 188 member states.” Additionally, it’s mission “is to lead the
development of a balanced and effective international intellectual property system . . . that
enables innovation and creativity for the benefit of all.” The organization’s “mandate,
governing bodies and procedures are set out in the WIPO convention, which established
WIPO in 1967.” Inside WIPO, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en (last visited May
19, 2014).
17 See About the WTO-A statement by former Director-General Pascal Lamy, WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/wto_dg_stat_e.htm (last visited Nov. 20,
2013) [hereinafter WTO Mission Statement].
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amalgamation of agreements18 as a place for countries to go to sort out their
various trade issues with each other.19 This collection of agreements
represented a “grand bargain” struck between all of the countries involved
during the Uruguay Rounds.20 One of these agreements, the Agreement on
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),21 brought
intellectual property (IP) rights into the purview of the WTO.22 TRIPS
instituted a global IP regime with specific requirements to safeguard and
implement copyrights and other provisions of IP law.23 The treaty also
“provides for minimum standards that bind all WTO members, coupled with
a system of international enforcement.”24 Another part of the grand bargain
of the Uruguay Round was the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS). The GATS is modeled on the earlier General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT),25 the basis for the WTO,26 “in both name and content.”27
The GATS, as the GATT does for trade in goods, outlines general principles
and obligations governing the trade of services.28 These principles are the
most-favored-nation (MFN) standard, national treatment (NT), and
18 Who We Are, WTO [hereinafter WTO Who We Are], http://www.wto.org/english/the
wto_e/whatis_e/who_we_are_e.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2013).
19 See Understanding the WTO, WTO, http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_
e/tif_e/htm [hereinafter Understanding the WTO], available at http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/tif_e.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2013).
20 See William A. Lovett, Bargaining Challenges and Conflicting Interests: Implementing
the Doha Round, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 951, 951–55 (2002) (providing a summary of the
“grand bargain” in international trade that occurred in the early to mid-1990s and the
economic results in the years that followed); see also Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization art. II(2), Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh
Agreement] (binding WTO member states to all annexed legal agreements, including TRIPS).
21 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994;
Marrakesh Agreement, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33
I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
22 Anu Bradford, When the WTO Works, and How It Fails, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 15–16
(2010).
23 Id. at 16 (citing TRIPS, arts. 9–14 (recognizing copyrights); id. at 15–21 (recognizing
trademarks); id. at 27–34 (recognizing patents)).
24 Id. (citing TRIPS, supra note 21, arts. 1(1), 3, 8 (describing the scope of obligations and
the basic principle of national treatment), arts. 63–64, 68–73 (describing the dispute settlement
mechanism)).
25 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
26 Kevin C. Kennedy, The GATT-WTO System at Fifty, 16 WIS. INT’L L.J. 421, 442–43
(1998).
27 Kevin C. Kennedy, A WTO Agreement on Investment: A Solution in Search of a
Problem?, 24 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 77, 104 (2003).
28 Id.
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transparency.29 Under GATS, MFN requires “that once the host accepts a
[specific type of] project from one home country, it will be required to
extend the same treatment to similar projects from any other member
country.”30 NT under the GATS differs slightly from the GATT in that it is a
“specific commitment” made in trade negotiations.31 At that point, “the
member guarantees it will impose no limits on market access or national
treatment in relation to services and service suppliers falling within the scope
of those sectors.”32 The transparency principle of GATS requires “that each
member clearly and fully reveal any laws or regulations that would affect
another entering member’s producers in services.”33 The MFN, the NT, and
transparency, along with various market access commitments,34 supported by
the GATS eight annexes of guidelines and deadlines, make up the main
obligations created by the GATS.35 The first two principles, MFN and NT,
and the market access commitments are the most important components of
the GATS in regards to this Note because Antigua alleged that the United
States violated these components (as well as multiple other articles that do
not fall within the scope of this Note) in the U.S.-Gambling dispute.36
Though the Dispute Settlement Body ultimately only proceeded with the
market access commitment claim, which will be discussed more in depth

29

Id.
Glenn M. Wiser, The Clean Development Mechanism Versus The World Trade
Organization: Can Free-Market Greenhouse Gas Emissions Abatement Survive Free Trade?,
11 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 531, 594 (1999).
31 Nancy J. King & Kishani Kalupahana, Choosing Between Liberalization and Regulatory
Autonomy under GATS: Implications of U.S.–Gambling for Trade in Cross Border E-Services,
40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1189, 1203 (2007).
32 Id. at 1206.
33 Christopher F. Thornberg & Frances L. Edwards, Failure of Trade Liberalization: A
Study of the GATS Negotiation, 10 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 325, 326–27 (2011) (citing GATS, supra
note 10, art. III(1)–(2)).
34 GATS, supra note 10, art. XVI (explaining that members of the GATS “shall accord
services and service suppliers of any other Member treatment no less favourable [sic] than that
provided for under the terms, limitations and conditions agreed and specified in its
Schedule”).
35 Kennedy, supra note 27, at 104–05.
36 United States — Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting
Services, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds285_e.htm (last visited
Apr. 5, 2014).
30
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later in the Note, it is still important to understand how these elements
interact and overlap with other international obligations under WIPO.37
2. The Dispute Settlement Body and Cross Retaliation
The Dispute Settlement Body, an organ of the WTO established under the
Uruguay Round, resolves all disputes between WTO members regarding
their obligations under the treaty and alleged violations.38 The Dispute
Settlement Body has the power to grant various remedies to injured member
states when another member state breaches its obligations.39 The available
remedies include authorizing member states to suspend various concessions
established under the WTO.40 Ordinarily, the suspension of concessions
should correspond with the area of trade where the original breach occurs.41
However, simply suspending concessions (such as reduced tariffs or MFN
status) is not always sufficient to compel the member state in breach to come
back into WTO compliance.42 This is characteristic of disputes between
countries with uneven trade relationships.43 When a developed member-state
is in breach and the injured member-state is developing, the typical
remedy—raising tariffs against the violating country by an amount equal to
the injured country’s loss—is not effective.44 In such cases, the Dispute
Settlement Body has the power to authorize an extraordinary remedy known

37

Decision by the Arbitrator, United States — Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply
of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 1.2, WT/DS285/ARB (Dec. 21, 2007) [hereinafter
Decision by Arbitrator-Gambling].
38 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes arts. 1–3,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2,
1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU].
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Allison L. Whiteman, Comment, Cross Retaliation Under the TRIPS Agreement: An
Analysis of Policy Options for Brazil, 36 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 187, 188 (2010).
42 Id. at 189–90 (explaining the significance of cross-retaliation as a means for leveraging
non-compliant member states back into compliance with WTO obligations).
43 Id. at 194.
44 Gabriel L. Slater, Note, The Suspension of Intellectual Property Obligations Under
TRIPS: A Proposal for Retaliating Against Technology-Exporting Countries in the World
Trade Organization, 97 GEO. L.J. 1365, 1374 (2009); see generally Decision by the
Arbitrators, European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas—Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities Under Article 22.6 of the
DSU, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU (Mar. 24, 2000) [hereinafter EC-Bananas].
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as cross-retaliation.45 Cross-retaliation allows the aggrieved member-state to
suspend its own WTO concessions to the breaching member-state in an area
of trade different from the area in which the breach occurred.46 This allows
the smaller, injured member-state to have substantially more leverage against
the larger, breaching member-state than would otherwise be available.47
The Dispute Settlement Body has authorized cross-retaliation only three
times since its creation.48 While the Dispute Settlement Body has no explicit
principle of stare decisis and thus these rulings are not technically binding,
there is much evidence that a de facto system of precedent is in place.49
Regardless of which view is more accurate, examining and analyzing these
decisions is vital to understanding the intricacies of how the cross-retaliation
system operates.
3. EC-Bananas
The first example are the notorious EC-Bananas50 cases that arose as a
result of the European Community’s unfair trade practices regarding its
imports of bananas from developing African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP)
countries.51 The United Kingdom, a member of the European Community
(EC),52 lobbied for preferential treatment for imports from these developing

45 DSU, supra note 38, art. 22.3; see also Thomas Sebastian, World Trade Organization
Remedies and the Assessment of Proportionality: Equivalence and Appropriateness, 48 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 337, 341–42 (2007) (explaining that, if necessary, cross retaliation under the WTO
can occur between trade in goods, trade in services, and protection of intellectual property
rights).
46 Whiteman, supra note 41, at 188–89 (explaining the option of cross-retaliating in areas of
service under the GATS or intellectual property under TRIPS in response to a breach of WTO
obligations in the trade of textiles under the GATT).
47 Id. at 189 (discussing the importance of cross-retaliation for Ecuador in leveraging the
European Community into compliance).
48 Sebastian, supra note 45, at 341; see also David J. Townsend, Stretching the Dispute
Settlement Understanding: U.S.—Cotton’s Relaxed Interpretation of Cross-Retaliation in the
World Trade Organization, 9 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 135, 136 (2010).
49 See generally Raj Bhala, The Myth About Stare Decisis and International Trade Law
(Part One of a Trilogy), 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 845 (1999) (discussing the lack of a formal
doctrine of stare decisis for WTO decisions and how the WTO, regardless of this fact, seems
to have a practical system of precedent it follows).
50 EC-Bananas, supra note 44.
51 See Development and Cooperation-Europeaid, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/
europeaid/where/acp/country-cooperation/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2013).
52 See Decision of the Council of European Communities of 22 January 1972 on the
Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, the Kingdom of Norway and the United
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ACP countries and it resulted in the Treaty of Lomé (Lomé).53 Lomé helped
shape a uniform banana regime for the European Economic Community.54
This new banana regime gave preference to ACP countries with both quotas
and tariffs.55 After a prolonged dispute brought by Ecuador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Mexico, and the United States, a Dispute Settlement Body panel
determined that this regime violated various obligations under the WTO and
its different agreements.56 This led to a series of appeals57 between the EC
and the aggrieved parties until the Dispute Settlement Body ultimately
authorized Ecuador to suspend some of its WTO concessions with the EC by
way of cross-retaliation.58 Particularly, Ecuador “received authorization to
suspend $201.6 million in concessions and other obligations under the WTO
Agreements, including . . . [TRIPS] and the . . . [GATS].”59 These approved
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the European Atomic Energy Community,
1972 O.J. (L 73).
53 ACP-EEC Convention of Lomé, O.J. (L 25), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 595 (1975); see
generally Zsolt K. Besskó, Going Bananas Over EEC Preferences?: A Look at the Banana
Trade War and the WTO’s Understanding On Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes, 28 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 265 (1996) (stating that pressure from United
Kingdom resulted in replacement of Yaounde Conventions with Lomé, which changed
relationship between EEC and former colonies from an association to a partnership).
54 Council Regulation 404/93, 1993 O.J. (L 47/1) (establishing a uniform banana regime for
the EEC “within the framework of the Lomé Convention Agreements”).
55 See Besskó, supra note 53 (stating ACP countries were allowed to import up to a maximum
of 857,700 tons of bananas into the common market duty free); see also Council Regulation
404/93 art. 15 (explaining non-traditional ACP countries and third countries may import up to 2
million tons into the common market at a 100 ECU/ton Tariff); accord Council Regulation
404/93 art. 18 (stating imports over the 2 million ton quota were subject to a 750ECU/ton tariff
for ACP country imports and an 850 per ton tariff for third country imports).
56 Panel Report, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution
of Bananas: Complaint by Ecuador, WT/DS27/R/ECU (May 22, 1997); Panel Report,
European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas:
Complaint by Guatemala and Honduras, WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND (May 22,
1997); Panel Report, United States: European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distribution of Bananas: Complaint by the United States, WT/DS27/R/USA (May 22,
1997) (noting that all complaining parties asserted inconsistencies under Articles 1.2, 1.3, 3.2,
and 3.5 of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures and Articles 2 and 17 of the
General Agreements in Trade Services).
57 Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas, ¶ 3, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997); see also Report of the Panel,
European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananasrecourse to Article 21.5 by Ecuador-, 1, 3, WT/DS27/RW/ECU (Apr. 12, 1999).
58 See EC-Bananas, supra note 50, at 173.
59 Matthew S. Dunne III, Note, Redefining Power Orientation: A Reassessment of
Jackson’s Paradigm in Light of Asymmetries of Power, Negotiation, and Compliance in the
GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System, 34 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 277, 305 (2002).
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actions were reportedly going to be used in a number of ways to leverage the
EC’s compliance, one of which was to mass-produce Ecuadorean
“Champagne” that was indistinguishable in labeling from the legitimate
French variety, thus putting pressure on France.60 Even though the
authorization was granted, the suspensions were never actually
implemented.61 Instead, they were used as a bargaining tool that led to an
agreement in October of 2000.62 While previous retaliation actions were
primarily between major developing powers and developed powers, this
marked the first time in the history of the WTO that a low power memberstate sought retaliation against a member-state with great influence inside
and outside of the Organization.63
4. U.S.-Cotton
The second time that cross-retaliation was approved was the U.S.-Cotton
dispute between the United States and Brazil.64 Brazil claimed the U.S.
agricultural subsidies to the American cotton industry violated the principles
of the WTO.65 The Dispute Settlement Body agreed.66 It authorized Brazil
to cross-retaliate by suspending its TRIPS obligations to the United States,
ultimately resulting in a change of U.S. cotton subsidy policy in multiple

60

Gabrielle Marceau, Counsellor, Legal Division, WTO, Lecture in Geneva, CHE (Jul. 16,
2013) (notes on file with author).
61 Dunne, supra note 59, at 307.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 305 (citing Andrew S. Bishop, The Second Legal Revolution in International Trade
Law: Ecuador Goes Ape in Banana Trade War with European Union, 12 INT’L LEGAL PERSP.
1, 2 (2001) (noting that the authorization obtained by Ecuador to retaliate against the EC
“represented the first time that the WTO had ever authorized a [low-power state] to impose
retaliatory measures on another member”)).
64 See Panel Report, United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R (Sept. 8,
2004) [hereinafter Panel Report Upland Cotton]; see generally Appellate Body Report, United
States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R (Mar. 3, 2005).
65 Id.
66 Decision by the Arbitrator, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton – Recourse to
Arbitration by the United States Under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM
Agreement, WT/DS267/ARB/1 (Aug. 31, 2009); see also Decision by the Arbitrator, United
States – Recourse to Arbitration by the United States Under Article 22.6 of the DSU and
Article 7.10 of the SCM Agreement, WT/DS267/ARB/2 (Aug. 31, 2009). (These reports are
collectively referred to as U.S.-Cotton in this Note.)
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areas67 after the two countries came to a settlement before any crossretaliation measures were implemented.68
5. U.S.-Gambling
The third and final instance of the Dispute Settlement Body approving
cross-retaliation was a result of the U.S.-Gambling dispute.69 As discussed
previously,70 Antigua and Barbuda claimed the United States violated the
GATS when it banned the use of online gambling websites, particularly
those headquartered in Antigua, but allowed gambling in various locations
throughout the United States.71 The Dispute Settlement Body agreed with
Antigua and Barbuda.72 After the United States failed to comply with the
WTO ruling, the WTO authorized Antigua to cross-retaliate against the
United States; now, Antigua could suspend its concessions to the United
States under TRIPS and violate U.S. intellectual property law.73 While the
general consensus of the international legal community was that Antigua
would not retaliate,74 the tiny island nation has recently declared that it
planned to do just that.75

67 Townsend, supra note 48, at 135–36, 153–55 (examining the policy changes the U.S.
implemented in light of U.S.-Cotton: removing the program that gave subsidies to buyers of
the more expensive American cotton and modifying export credit guarantees to be less
protective from the fluctuations of the market).
68 Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S., Brazil Agree Upon Path
Toward Negotiated Solution of Cotton Dispute (Apr. 2010), available at http://www.ustr.gov/
about-us/press-office/press-releases/2010/april/us-brazil-agree-upon-path-toward-negotiated-s
olution.
69 Decision by the Arbitrator, United States — Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply
of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/ARB (Dec. 21, 2007).
70 See supra Part II.A.1.
71 Decision by the Arbitrator-Gambling, supra note 37.
72 Appellate Body Report, United States Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 373(c)(ii), WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) [hereinafter
Appellate Body Report-Gambling].
73 Recourse by Antigua and Barbuda to Article 22.2 of the DSU, United States-Measures
Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/22 (June 22,
2007).
74 Gabriel L. Slater, Note, The Suspension of Intellectual Property Obligations Under
TRIPS: A Proposal for Retaliating Against Technology-Exporting Countries in the World
Trade Organization, 97 GEO. L.J. 1365, 1368, 1378–79 (2009).
75 Levick Release, supra note 8.
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6. TRIPS’ IP Suspension
To date, the Dispute Settlement Body has authorized the suspension of
TRIPS IP obligations in two of these three disputes:76 EC-Bananas III77 and
U.S.-Gambling.78 The first of these two disputes came to a close when the
European Community agreed to change its unfair trade practices regarding
bananas and become compliant with its WTO obligations.79 However, the
second of the two disputes is still up in the air, with the WTO approving
Antigua’s proposed suspension of U.S. copyrights and Antigua threatening to
act on their proposal.80 Antigua’s proposal removes its obligations under the
TRIPS81 agreement as retaliation for the United States’ refusal to comply
with its GATS82 obligations in regards to online gambling services.83
Adding even more intrigue to the dispute, there are rumors that Antigua will
work in collaboration with the infamous website, The Pirate Bay, to set up a
file-sharing website to implement the cross-retaliation.84 The website would
either give away U.S. copyrighted materials for free and make back the lost
$3.4 billion through ad revenue or sell access to the copyrighted material for
a meager amount.85
If Antigua goes through with its threat, it will mark the first occurrence
such a right has ever been exercised under the WTO.86 In terms of
obligations, this would arguably represent a fundamental change from what
was originally agreed to by the high contracting parties.

76

Id. at 1368.
EC-Bananas, supra note 50.
78 Decision by Arbitrator-Gambling, supra note 37.
79 See Joe Kirwin, EU Foreign Ministers Give Qualified Backing to Transitional Banana
Tariff-Quota Proposal, 17 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1540, 1540 (Oct. 12, 2000).
80 Levick Release, supra note 8.
81 TRIPS, supra note 21.
82 GATS, supra note 10.
83 Levick Release, supra note 8.
84 Ernesto, supra note 12.
85 Id.
86 Elizabeth J. Drake, Antigua and U.S. Dispute Proposed Withdrawal of Intellectual
Property Rights Protections as Authorized WTO Retaliation: Implications for the WTO
Dispute Settlement System (2013), available at http://www.stewartlaw.com/article/ViewArti
cle/846.
77
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B. WIPO and the International Copyright Regime
The nations of the world have attempted to deal with the issue of
intellectual property on an international scale long before the creation of
TRIPS and the WTO.87 There are numerous treaties that collectively form
the patchwork of international intellectual property law.88 The World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), an organ of the United Nations,
administers a large portion of these treaties.89 These WIPO treaties exist in
tandem with TRIPS.90 WIPO administers twenty-six individual treaties,91
but two in particular stand out in importance to this discussion: the Berne
Convention and the Paris Convention.
1. The Berne Convention
The Berne Convention (Berne)92 is the most important of the WIPO
treaties for purposes of this discussion. Berne establishes standards for
international copyright protection.93 When TRIPS was drafted many years
after the creation of the Berne, it borrowed specific language from Berne and
directly incorporated those provisions into its own obligations.94 There was
no requirement for the contracting parties of TRIPS to join Berne if they had
not already done so.95 What occurred was simply an adoption of a set of
standards that was already in place. Most importantly for the discussion at
hand, this absorption of Berne’s language did not absorb the high contracting
parties obligations under that convention.96 As a result, since there is no
87 See WIPO—A Brief History, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/about-wip
o/en/history.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2013).
88 Jonathan Franklin, International Intellectual Property Law, American Society of
International Law Electronic Resource Guide 4 (Feb. 8, 2013), available at http://www.asil.
org/sites/default/files/ERG_IP.pdf.
89 See WIPO-Administered Treaties, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/tre
aties/en/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2013).
90 Slater, supra note 74, at 1375–76.
91 See WIPO-Administered Treaties, supra note 89.
92 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 99-27, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971 and amended
in 1979); see Summary of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works (1886), WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/summary
_berne.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2013).
93 Slater, supra note 74, at 1376–77.
94 Id.
95 See id.
96 See id.
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absorption of Berne’s treaty obligations, the WTO’s suspension of Antigua’s
TRIPS obligations to the United States would have no effect on Antigua’s
obligations under the Berne Convention,97 a treaty both countries are parties
to.98
2. The Paris Convention
The Paris Convention99 (Paris) harmonizes the international patent and
trademark fields for the high contracting parties.100 As with Berne, TRIPS
adopts language from Paris but it does not absorb the treaty obligations of
Paris.101 Both the United States and Antigua are parties to Paris.102 This
presents the same problem as Berne: obligations are copied, but not
absorbed, and when obligations under one treaty are modified, the two
treaties requirements imposed may conflict.
C. The Conflict
When TRIPS adopted segments of Berne and Paris,103 but did not absorb
the obligations that those respective treaties created, two pieces of
international agreements that once fit together without conflict now exist in
tension. The cross-retaliation measures authorized by the Dispute Settlement
Body allow for a fundamental shifting of the underlying treaty obligations
for the high contracting parties involved. This creates a collision course
between the international intellectual property regimes of WIPOadministered treaties and the international trade regime of the WTO and its
underlying treaties.
97

See id.
WIPO-Administered Treaties Contracting Parties Berne Convention, WORLD INTELL.
PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?treaty_id=15 (last visited Oct.
24, 2013).
99 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, July 14, 1967,
21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (as last revised at the Stockholm Revision Conference); see
Summary of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1883), WORLD
INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/ paris/summary_paris.html (last visited
Sept. 18, 2013).
100 Slater, supra note 74, at 1376.
101 Id.
102 WIPO Administered Treaties Contracting Parties Paris Convention, WORLD INTELL.
PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?country_id=ALL&start_year=
ANY&end_year=ANY&search_what=C&treaty_id=2 (last visited Oct. 24, 2013).
103 See TRIPS, supra note 21.
98
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Overview
This collision course begs the question: what does this tension mean for
international law? Multiple levels of analysis are necessary to answer this
question. A great deal of political brinkmanship is at play in this issue. The
politics of the U.S.-Antigua relationship and the lobbying efforts of
Hollywood (much like the spirits lobby in the EC-Bananas dispute)104 and
any other parties that would be harmed by Antigua’s threatened crossretaliation, will significantly impact the results of this dispute. Trade and
investment treaty negotiations, campaign contributions, and other national
and international dealings will influence the outcome. However, the main
issue this Note examines is the impending legal conflict between Berne and
TRIPS, as well as other potential regime clashes, and the ramifications
stemming from them.
There are a number of other possible conflicts that could result from the
authorized cross-retaliation measures.
Conflicts between the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)105 and TRIPS or between the
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) and TRIPS. The risk of some
potential conflicts, such as between TRIPS and Bilateral Investment Treaties
or Free Trade Agreements, has been hedged against by thoughtful treaty
drafting. Subsequently, these treaties will be examined for their utility in
modeling future treaties and agreements to prevent conflict.
B. Conflicts
There are a number of international regimes that could conflict as a result
of Antigua’s approved cross-retaliation. Some appear to be facial conflicts,
such as Berne-TRIPS and NAFTA-TRIPS while others such as TRIPSACTA, are more nuanced. Though ACTA references TRIPS, the national

104 Isaac Wohl, The Antigua-United States Online Gambling Dispute, J. INT’L COM. & ECON.
(2009), available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/journals/online_gambling_dispu
te.pdf (citing JAMES MCCALL SMITH, Compliance Bargaining in the WTO: Ecuador and the
Bananas Dispute, in NEGOTIATING TRADE: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO AND NAFTA
257–88 (John S. Odell ed., 2006) (explaining the European Spirits industry’s immediate
lobbying efforts when their IP rights were threatening by cross-retaliation)).
105 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289
(1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
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legislation of the contracting parties implementing ACTA may create
conflict.106 These three conflicts are examined in turn.
1. Berne-TRIPS
If Antigua and Barbuda acts on its authorization to suspend its IP
concessions to the United States, there will be a facial conflict between their
obligations under the Berne Convention and their authorization to crossretaliate by suspending TRIPS concessions to the United States.107 If the
conflict went the other way, a breach of TRIPS hypothetically authorized by
Berne, this question might be answered more authoritatively by a ruling from
the Dispute Settlement Body. However, because Berne does not authorize a
tribunal to enforce its implementation,108 its obligations might simply go
unenforced. Conversely, the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO has
already spoken on this matter, not surprisingly ruling on behalf of itself that
its obligations and authorizations are superior.109
Another wrinkle involved in the possibility of The Pirate Bay’s
involvement is that the website’s founders were prosecuted and convicted in
a Swedish court110 for the very same acts that they would be committing by
helping Antigua. Because the website would deal with U.S. copyright and it
would presumably be operated from Antigua, the very nature of such a
website would make it universally accessible. The cross-retaliation between
Antigua and Barbuda and the United States could jump across the Atlantic
Ocean to Europe with a few clicks of the mouse. Could those involved in
this proposed file sharing website be prosecuted elsewhere for their actions?
What about the individuals downloading the copyright-suspended material
for free or for a fee they paid to Antigua? How much preemption, if any,
does an authorization from the Dispute Settlement Body have over other
106 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, art. 6 § 1, Oct. 1, 2011, available at http://www.
mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/i_property/pdfs/acta1105_en.pdf [hereinafter ACTA].
107 Slater, supra note 74, at 1375–77.
108 Berne, supra note 92; Slater, supra note 74, at 1376–77; Allen Z. Hertz, Shaping the
Trident: Intellectual Property under NAFTA, Investment Protection Agreements and at the
World Trade Organization, 23 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 261, 268–76 (1997).
109 See JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW WTO
LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 346–47 (2003); see also EC-Bananas,
supra note 44; ERICH VRANES, Cross Retaliation Under GATS and TRIPS — An Optimal
Enforcement Device for Developing Countries?, in THE BANANA DISPUTE: AN ECONOMIC AND
LEGAL ANALYSIS 113, 122–27 (Fritz Breuss et al. eds., 2003).
110 Pfanner, supra note 4.
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international or even national legal regimes? These questions threaten
dangerous international ramifications from Antiqua’s proposed action that
will be discussed more fully later in this Note.
2. ACTA-TRIPS
While the main issues of conflicting international regimes would certainly
arise from treaties and organizations that both the United States and Antigua
are parties to, there remains the possibility of issues arising from treaties
those countries have not ratified. Other multilateral treaties, such as ACTA,
impose obligations on their members to have enforcement measures in place
for the protection of the intellectual property rights of other member states.111
This obligation creates a very real possibility that a third-party nation to the
U.S.-Antigua dispute would become involved if one of its citizens partook in
the “Freedom Bay.” The treaty is non-self-executing,112 which essentially
obligates the high contracting parties to implement the provisions of the law
with their own national legislation.113 So, while ACTA states, “[n]othing in
this Agreement shall derogate from any obligation of a Party with respect to
any other Party under existing agreements, including the TRIPS
Agreement”114 it is still an independent treaty from TRIPS. Additionally, the
laws passed by each high contracting party are also independent from
TRIPS:
Each Party shall ensure that enforcement procedures are
available under its law so as to permit effective action against
any act of infringement of intellectual property rights covered
by this Agreement, including expeditious remedies to prevent
infringements and remedies which constitute a deterrent to
further infringements. These procedures shall be applied in

111

ACTA, supra note 106, art. 6, § 1.
Monika Ermert, Last Parliament Standing: Europe Final Stronghold of ACTA Critics,
INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Dec. 21, 2011, 7:39 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/2011/12/21/lastparliament-standing-europe-final-stronghold-of-acta-critics/.
113 Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (1 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829); see also Whitney v. Robertson, 124
U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (explaining that self-executing treaties require no implementing
legislation to make them operative).
114 ACTA, supra note 106, art. 1.
112
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such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate
trade and to provide for safeguards against their abuse.115
There is also conflict in regard to interpreting how ACTA and TRIPS
interact. For example, some commentators view TRIPS as not merely a
benchmark for the bare minimum of intellectual property protections
required by member-states, but also as the maximum allowable for a state to
establish.116 If this interpretation were correct, any “TRIPS-plus” protections
such as ACTA would violate TRIPS117 and possibly lead to a WTO dispute.
Such a conflict could be avoided if the WTO better defined whether TRIPS
acts merely as a floor or both as a minimum and maximum limit to
enforcement. Additionally, the WTO could rewrite ACTA’s national
enforcement obligation provision to specify exactly how the provisions
should interact with TRIPS obligations rather than merely saying that the
national legislation should “avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate
trade.”118 Better regard for the interactions between international agreements
of a similar subject matter would be incredibly beneficial for preventing
future conflicts of this sort.
3. NAFTA-TRIPS
Another regime that TRIPS could possibly conflict with is NAFTA.119
While the WTO has derogation exceptions for regional trade unions under
Article XXIV, these exceptions only apply to preferential treatment of goods
and other concessions.120 Article XXIV does not apply to interpretations,
judgments, or determinations of the tribunals of such regional trade
unions.121 NAFTA has such tribunals.122 With both trade unions having
their own independent tribunals, there is always a possibility that the bodies
115

Id. art. 6 § 1.
Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, A Trade Agreement Creating Barriers to International
Trade?: ACTA Border Measures and Goods in Transit, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 645, 654–55
(2011).
117 Id. at 655.
118 ACTA, supra note 106, art. 6 § 1.
119 See NAFTA, supra note 105.
120 GATT, supra note 25, art. XXIV § 5.
121 Id.
122 NAFTA, supra note 105, art. 20.3; Anthony DePalma, Nafta’s Powerful Little Secret;
Obscure Tribunals Settle Disputes, but Go Too Far, Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2001,
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/11/business/nafta-s-powerful-little-secret-obscure-tribunalssettle-disputes-but-go-too-far.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (last visited Dec. 5, 2013).
116
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will hand down conflicting rulings or interpretations. This will very likely
come to a head in the recent Zeroing cases that came before both tribunals.123
Zeroing is a practice related to what is known as “dumping” in the trade
world that has become rather contentious in recent years.124
This problem is more nuanced than the ACTA-TRIPS relationship
because both bodies have tribunals that can very rule differently on the same
subject matter including when the parties involved are subject to both
rulings. To stymie such a situation, one body would likely need to defer to
the other. Whether such deference would be given is unclear.
C. Models to Prevent Future Conflict
A handful of treaties and agreements that have occurred post-Berne have
had the foresight to outline how they will interact with other existing treaties.
This practice insulates the contracting parties against any future conflicts of
treaty obligations. In the realm of IP law, such provisions seem to be
exclusively contained in bilateral investment treaties and free trade
agreements as opposed to larger multilateral agreements (though some of the
free trade agreements are multilateral). This Note will examine these treaties
and agreements as models for future treaty drafting to prevent nations from
entering into agreements that are initially not conflicting but gradually
become so by modified obligations through adjudicative measures (such as
cross-retaliation).
1. BITs
Unlike international trade, which is mainly regulated by multilateral
agreements like the WTO and NAFTA,125 investment is mostly dealt with in
123

Article 1904 Binational Panel Review Pursuant to the North American Free Trade
Agreement, USA-MEX-2007-1904-01; see generally Sungjoon Cho, The WTO Appellate
Body Strikes Down the U.S. Zeroing Methodology Used in Antidumping Investigations, ASIL
INSIGHTS (May 4, 2006), http://www.asil.org/insights/volu me/10/issue/10/wto-appellatebody-strikes-down-us-zeroing-methodology-used-antidumping (providing background on
zeroing and the Appellate Body’s reaction to zeroing).
124 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 2005, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201; Anti-dumping, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/wto-multilateral-affairs/wto-issues/tr
ade-remedies/anti-dumping (last visited Oct. 24, 2013) (explaining the significance of
dumping, anti-dumping regulation, and the role of the WTO in the matter).
125 Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Getting Along: The Evolution of Dispute Resolution Regimes
in International Trade Organizations, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 697, 700 (1999).
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separate, bilateral treaties126 that collectively resembles a “spaghetti bowl” of
investment.127
Many of these treaties commonly incorporate intellectual property
provisions.128 Some BITs explicitly discuss their interaction with TRIPS,
such as the U.S. Model BIT.129 However, others that are like the Model
German BIT130 do not mention the GATS explicitly, though they do discuss
interactions with other international obligations.131 While there is a
possibility of conflict, these provisions seem to make such conflict highly
unlikely by specifying the limits of the BIT in areas that it would interact
with TRIPS or by stating that the provisions are in line with TRIPS and
should be interpreted as such. Subsequently, such a provision is a good
model for how to draft a treaty or agreement in a way that avoids clashing
treaty regimes or obligations.
2. Free Trade Agreements
Another possible overlap arises from free trade agreements. As
previously mentioned, Article XXIV of the GATT allows for regional trade
agreements and creates an exception for them in regards to other obligations
under that treaty.132 These free trade agreements (FTAs), like BITs, often
include provisions dealing with intellectual property.133 Most FTAs lay out
126 Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work? An Evaluation of
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 67, 67 (2005).
127 U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., INVESTMENT PROVISIONS IN ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION AGREEMENTS, at 10, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2005/10 (2006), available at http://uncta
d.org/en/Docs/iteiit200510ch1_en.pdf.
128 Model US Bilateral Investment Treaty (2012) [hereinafter Model U.S. BIT], available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf; Model
German Bilateral Investment Treaty (2008) [hereinafter Model German BIT], available at http://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/archive/ita1025.pdf; Model French Bilateral Investment
Treaty (2006) http://www.italaw.com/documents/ModelTreaty France2006.pdf; Model Indian
Bilateral Investment Treaty (2003), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/archive/ita1026.
pdf.
129 Model U.S. BIT, supra note 128.
130 Model German BIT, supra note 128.
131 Id. art. 7 § 1.
132 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
133 U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Aust., art. 17.1, Mar. 3, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 1248
[hereinafter U.S.-Australia FTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/up
loads/agreements/fta/australia/asset_upload_file148_5168.pdf; U.S.–Israel Free Trade
Agreement, U.S.-Isr., art. 14, Apr. 22, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 657 [hereinafter U.S.-Israel FTA],
available at http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/All_Trade_Agreements/exp_005439.asp;
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specific treaty obligations already in force and discuss the interaction
between all of them, like the U.S.-Australia FTA134 and the E.U.-Korea
FTA.135 However, some simply reaffirm existing IP treaty obligations in
general without discussing specific treaties or provisions, like the U.S.-Israel
FTA.136 Both styles seem to contemplate conflicts with the other treaties and
subsequently hedge against any future clash by discussing the interactions
between all the relevant treaties. Possible conflict is also avoided by
requiring both parties to ratify or accede to certain existing treaties, as seen
in the U.S.-Australia FTA.137 Like the previously discussed BITs, FTAs of
this type provide an excellent model for treaty drafting that would prevent
future conflict of international regimes by specifically outlining where one
treaty ends and the other begins, as well as where the treaties agree or do not
overlap. In regards to the different styles, it is not immediately clear which
format would provide superior protection against such an outcome, but either
route is more desirable than the status quo.
D. Lessons Learned
1. Risks of the Status Quo
There are a number of lessons to be gleaned from this discussion of
international regimes. First, the amorphous nature of these numerous treaties
and international bodies that come as a result of cross-retaliation measures
creates the risk of conflict. The use of linkage to achieve the aforementioned
“grand bargain”138 by way of linking various issues such as trade and
intellectual property together creates overlap between regimes. The U.S.Antigua dispute represents a possible Pandora’s Box in this world of
overlapping regimes.
While there is certainly a possibility of the two nations settling before
Antigua goes through with its threats,139 this situation represents a very real
NAFTRA, supra note 105, art. 1701; E.U.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, E.U.-Kor., ch. 10,
Oct. 15, 2009, 2011 O.J. (L 127), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUri
Serv.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:127:FULL:EN:PDF.
134 U.S.-Australia FTA, supra note 133.
135 E.U.-Korea FTA, supra note 133.
136 U.S.-Israel FTA, supra note 133.
137 U.S.-Australia FTA, supra note 133, art. 17.1 §§ 2, 4.
138 Lovett, supra note 20, at 952.
139 See Hartley Henderson, Antigua offers a new proposal to end Internet gambling dispute
with U.S., OFF SHORE GAMING ASSOC., available at http://www.osga.com/online_gaming_arti
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conflict that can arise in the future despite the outcome of this specific
dispute. If not gambling, perhaps another issue of trade will arise between
WTO member-states and spark a similar clash of regimes. To avoid such a
clash, the current state of overlapping systems of international regulation
must be thoroughly reexamined and restructured into a uniform agreement or
complimentary agreements.
2. Building on Past Success
To explain the success of the WTO in further opening international trade
and connecting markets,140 many point to the structure of the Dispute
Settlement Body.141 The author of this Note posits that the success of the
WTO is in part based upon the absorption of various existing treaties and
their subsequent unification under the WTO, resulting in a more uniform
system. This success should be built upon by further streamlining the
associated international regimes through merging treaties and simplifying
obligations. International IP regulation, as well as other international
regimes with overlapping agreements, should undergo a unification effort to
streamline the various agreements and multilateral treaties. Such unification
would create uniformity in the global market, make the resolution of
international intellectual property issues and disputes more predictable,
provide more stable and cognizable protection for intellectual property right
holders, and, most importantly, eliminate the possibility of facing liability
from one regime when following the authorized action or obligations of
another regime.
3. Linkage Is a Double-Edged Sword
Linkage can be a fantastic tool at the negotiating table. However, if it is
used haphazardly and continually without any unification of regimes along
the way there will always be a possibility of conflicting regimes when there
is an overlap. Different rules, standards, and interpretations all present
problematic encounters for such regimes and could very easily put nations in
the awkward legal position of violating one regime to comply with another.
cles.php?Antigua-offers-a-new-proposal-to-end-Internet-gambling-dispute-with-U.S.-14330#.
VVud0NNViko (last visited May 19, 2014).
140 See MARC L. BUSCH & ERIC REINHARDT, TRADE BRIEF ON THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
1 (2004), available at http://faculty.georgetown.edu/ mlb66/SIDA.pdf.
141 DSU, supra note 38, art. 1.
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This possibility is even more likely with measures like cross-retaliation142
being used that essentially modify the initial agreement and its obligations.
A country could sign on to two different multilateral treaties that are not
initially in conflict but eventually conflict when a cross-retaliation measure,
or some other modifying action, is approved. It could certainly be argued
that such modifications are reasonably foreseeable and thus should be
contemplated at the time of drafting or at least at the time of signing or
ratification. However, returning to the other WTO disputes mentioned,
particularly the U.S.-Antigua dispute, the outcome was not expected.143 At
the very least, it does not seem that the United States would have pushed so
hard for the inclusion of cross-retaliation measures144 if it foresaw it being
used in such a fashion against itself. The more these measures are embraced,
the more likely this collision of laws will occur. When treaties do conflict,
what will result is unclear.
4. A Realistic Approach
There are various approaches that might clarify this issue. From a simply
realistic viewpoint, it would seem that whichever international regime was
the most robust in terms of enforcement would win. In the U.S.-Antigua
dispute, it seems the WTO would come out on top over the WIPO
administered treaties, such as Berne. The WTO has the Dispute Settlement
Body but Berne has no real means of enforcement in the United States as a
non-self-executing treaty.145 In a situation where both regimes do have
tribunals, like a hypothetical clash between NAFTA and the WTO, the result
would be far more difficult to predict. If two tribunals were to hand down
conflicting rulings on the same issue, a member-state bound to both tribunals
would be placed in an impossible legal situation. Additionally, such a
situation could open up a massive amount of liability for a country and its
industries.

142

See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
1867 U.N.T.S. 154.
143 Gary Rivlin, Online Gambling Pits Antigua against U.S. and Challenges WTO, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 22, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/22/business/worldbusiness/22iht-ga
mble.4.7214682.html?pagewanted=all.&_r=0.
144 Lowrey, supra note 11.
145 Robert J. Sherman, Note, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: American Artists Burned
Again, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 373, 403–06 (1995) (explaining how the United States Congress
interpreted the Berne Convention in such a way that it was non-self-executing).
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5. An Interpretive Approach
From an interpretive view of international law, the “winning” regime
might be determined by which treaty came later. Under the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention),146 the “latest
expression of state intent, in casu, the [Dispute Settlement Body]
authorisation [sic] [to suspend TRIPS obligations], must prevail.”147 In other
words, whichever agreement came later would be the agreement that is
binding in case of a conflict. It would not be a stretch to apply such an
interpretation to a conflict between an international organization, such as the
Dispute Settlement Body, and a treaty, like Berne. This would seemingly
result in the WTO winning out over Berne in the U.S.–Antigua dispute.
However, there is a multitude of potential problems involved in such an
interpretation.
First, the Vienna Convention seems to be contemplating one treaty being
replaced with or superseded by a later-in-time treaty. The drafters of the
Vienna Convention likely did not contemplate treaties with an amorphous
shape, such as the WTO treaties after the authorization of cross-retaliation,148
because such treaties did not exist when the Vienna Convention was signed
in 1969. As previously mentioned, TRIPS did not absorb the obligations of
Berne nor did it expressly supersede Berne.149 It adopted much of the
language of Berne,150 which seems to indicate the two treaties were intended
to work together instead of the latter replacing the former. That being said,
the Vienna Convention does outline the analytical process for when you have
successive treaties on the same subject.151 This analysis would point to
146 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter Vienna Convention]. It should be noted that the United States has not ratified the
Vienna Convention. However, the Vienna Convention is largely a codification of the binding
customary international law governing the relations between nations so it is still applicable.
See, e.g., Evan Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty
Interpretation, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 431, 433–34 (2004).
147 Slater, supra note 74, at 1377 (explaining that the method of interpreting overlapping
treaties and international organizations is based on the latest expression of state intent) (citing
Pauwelyn, supra note 109).
148 DSU, supra note 38, arts. 1–30.
149 Slater, supra note 74, at 1376–77.
150 Id.
151 Vienna Convention, supra note 146, art. 30(4)(a) (stating that as between States party to
both successive treaties relating to the same subject matter where the earlier treaty is not
terminated or suspended in operation under article 59 of the Vienna Treaty, the earlier treaty
applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the latter treaty).
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Berne only applying to the degree that it did not conflict with the WTO
treaties, subsequently allowing for the cross-retaliation of Antigua against
the United States under both the WTO treaties and Berne.
Second, claiming that “the latest expression of state intent”152 is what
determines which agreement trumps the other is obviously focusing the
analysis on the intent of the state. But if the United States never imagined
the cross-retaliation provision being used to suspend IP rights as a result of
its national legislation regarding online gambling, can it really be said that
there was state intent? The United States maintains that it never intended for
online gambling to be included in the United States’ GATS obligations.153
Those protests aside, the Appellate Body found that online gambling was
within the scope of the United States’ GATS obligations,154 though they
acknowledged that it was possible that online gambling entered into the
scope by mistake.155 If it is the case that this obligation came by mistake,
was “the latest expression of state intent” really to make the United States
subject to suspensions of its IP rights? While this is a seemingly valid
concern of intent, it likely does not matter. Whether or not the United States
intended to subject itself to such suspensions of obligations by Antigua,
expressed intent is what is key.156 The actual intentions of the United States
do not affect what the Appellate Body found to be expressed by the United
States in its GATS obligations. Subsequently, this possible wrinkle would
likely be overcome for the previously stated reasons.
A third issue that could arise from an interpretation that the WTO treaties
supplant Berne is the possibility of an Article 53 invalidation. Article 53 of
The Vienna Convention invalidates agreements that violate preemptory
norms of international law at the time of signing.157 The United States could
claim that the protection of IP rights is so fundamental to modern society that
it is such a preemptory norm (or jus cogens) of international law that no
derogation is allowed. However, this would almost certainly fail as well.
There are two major flaws in such an argument. First, the very existence of
the WTO and its 159 members158 would indicate that international custom
152

Slater, supra note 74, at 1376–77.
Rothstein, supra note 10, at 174.
154 Appellate Body Report-Gambling, supra note 72.
155 Panel Report, Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting
Services, ¶ 6.136, WT/D238/R (Nov. 10, 2004).
156 Slater, supra note 74, at 1377.
157 Vienna Convention, supra note 146, art. 53.
158 Understanding the WTO: Members and Observers, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2013).
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does allow for derogation from IP rights since the WTO implements crossretaliation. While the Vienna Convention does specify that it looks at the
custom at the time of the signing,159 not after, there still would likely not be a
strong consensus on IP rights and their protection.160 Second, and likely the
most practical problem, the United States is simply not going to claim the
whole WTO regime is invalidated merely so it can avoid losing a dispute. In
2010, the United States exported $518 billion in commercial services
alone,161 making the $3.4 billion162 Antigua is claiming look like a mere
pittance. It would be completely irrational to jeopardize the whole system of
trade, not just in services but goods as well, that the United States relies on
for such a sum that is meager in comparison.
IV. CONCLUSION
International law needs to become more unified and streamlined. The
U.S.-Antigua dispute is a warning of things to come, whether or not Antigua
actually acts on its threat of cross-retaliation. Sooner or later, international
regimes and treaties will conflict in a grand fashion with disastrous results
for both the member-states and the organizations themselves. Such an
outcome can be stymied—or even prevented entirely—by acting in two
specific ways. First, current multilateral agreements should be merged into a
more streamlined organization, such the WTO, where it is appropriate and
feasible. Second, future treaties should be drafted in a way that contemplates
interaction with other international obligations and regimes so the member
states that are parties to both are not left guessing which obligation they
should risk violating. As technology advances and globalization connects
the world more and more, new laws will be created and new forms of
regulation will be drafted to keep up with the times. These new laws and
regulations must be formed with an eye on this issue to prevent a
recrudescence of conflicting regimes. Otherwise, the question of pirate or
privateer will never be answered.
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